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Abstract According to the disciplining hypothesis, globalization restrains governments by
inducing increased budgetary pressure. As a consequence, governments may attempt to cur-
tail the welfare state, which is often seen as a drag on international competitiveness, by re-
ducing especially their expenditures on transfers and subsidies. This globalization-induced
welfare state retrenchment is potentially mitigated by citizens’ preferences to be compen-
sated for the risks of globalization (“compensation hypothesis”). Employing two different
datasets and various measures of globalization, we analyze whether globalization has indeed
influenced the composition of government expenditures. For a sample of 60 countries, we
examine the development of four broad expenditure categories for the period 1971–2001:
capital expenditures, expenditures for goods and services, interest payments, and subsidies
and other current transfers. A second dataset provides a much more detailed classification:
public expenditures, expenditures for defence, order, economic affairs, environment, hous-
ing, health, recreation, education, and social expenditures. However, this second data set is
only available since 1990—and only for OECD countries. Our results show that globaliza-
tion did not influence the composition of government expenditures in a notable way.
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1 Introduction
The number of scholarly investigations of the nexus between globalization and the welfare
state is impressive and the literature is still growing at a rapid pace. The scientific commu-
nity contributing to this literature is by no means restricted to the economics profession;
political scientists, in particular, but also sociologists and other social scientists have been
strongly involved in this ongoing academic endeavour. Even though there can be no doubt
that one of the driving forces behind this research activity is intellectual curiosity regarding
the essential consequences of one of the arguably most important economic phenomena of
our time, it appears that many social scientists are also attracted to the subject because of the
public debate that the globalization issue has aroused. Since globalization has far reaching
effects on so many important aspects of everyday life, it is a topic well suited for political
entrepreneurs to rig the public political discourse and to mobilize political support. The po-
litical agents who have used the globalization issue as a vehicle to advance their agendas
range from well-meaning public figures concerned about the globalization induced social
dynamic, to political demagogues and street rioters.
The worries of the well-meaning objectors to global economic integration originate in the
conviction that globalization will bring about a loss of power of the nation states in general,
and a reduction in welfare state activities, in particular. The reasoning behind these fears runs
as follows: trade liberalization and liberalization of factor mobility, via indirect factor price
equalization and direct arbitrage effects, erode the developed countries’ income and capital
tax bases and will eventually give rise to a global tax race to the bottom which, in turn, results
in the nation states’ fading ability to finance welfare state activities. This downward pressure
on the supply side of public welfare programs, depending on the viewpoint of the observer,
reduces the efficiency of benevolent governments (cf. Sinn 2003) and/or disciplines egoistic
governments who transform discretionary power into benefits for their clientele (cf. Breton
and Ursprung 2002). The so-called “efficiency” or “discipline” effect of globalization thus
reduces the range and size of government welfare programs.
By focusing on the efficiency effect of globalization, the opponents of global economic
integration and unchecked systems competition neglect, however, the demand side of the
political market. The demand-side effects of globalization derive from the governments’ po-
litical support maximization motives that direct the political process towards a redistribution
of the globalization induced economic gains, i.e., losers from globalization are to some ex-
tent compensated via an increase of social welfare programs. The so-called “compensation”
effect of globalization thus undermines the “efficiency” effect, implying that from a theoret-
ical point of view the total effect of globalization on the extent of national welfare programs
remains ambiguous.
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the nexus between globalization and national welfare
policies, it is not surprising that much of the respective literature is empirical. However,
as the literature review in the next section shows, a robust impact of globalization on gov-
ernment expenditures does not appear to exist. The reason might be that compensation and
disciplining effects neutralize each other. It is possible, however, that the impact of these
two effects depends on the type of expenditure. Therefore, any true test investigating the
impact of globalization on expenditures has to focus upon shifts in the relevant expenditure
shares. It is this link between globalization and expenditure shares that our paper deals with.
We follow the strategy of using disaggregated data and superior econometric techniques that
characterize the second-generation studies on the globalization-welfare state nexus. In con-
trast to the existing literature we do, however, not estimate the impact of globalization on
individual policy dimensions, but acknowledge that all policy measures are to some extent
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substitutes or complements vis-à-vis each other, implying that indirect globalization effects,
working through changes in related welfare-state activities, may play an important role.
Mutual interdependence is clearly an issue if one focuses, as we do, on disaggregated gov-
ernment spending since all categories of government spending are connected via the overall
budget policy.1 While previous studies investigated the impact of globalization on a range
of individual expenditure shares in GDP (see the literature review below) none of them took
indirect effects into account. Applying our research strategy, we might be able to uncover
globalization effects that remain otherwise hidden.
Our empirical strategy is thus to estimate whole systems of equations in order to uncover
to what extent the relative importance of specific expenditure categories is influenced by
globalization. According to the compensation hypothesis some categories may become more
important even if the overall level of government expenditures remains unchanged. This
particularly applies to social expenditures. The disciplining effect of globalization, on the
other hand, will have a detrimental effect on all kinds of welfare state expenditures.
In the remainder of this paper we analyze whether and to what extent globalization in-
fluences the composition of government expenditures. We use two different datasets that
focus on different countries, periods and decompositions of government expenditures. In
an attempt to obtain robust results, we employ different measures of globalization. Our re-
sults indicate that none of the investigated expenditure categories has been robustly affected
by any of our globalization indicators. In our view, this implies that either the hitherto ne-
glected interaction effects blur the two direct effects to a rather large extent, or governments
throughout the world have not rearranged their expenditure shares as a result of globaliza-
tion.
The next section summarizes the mainly empirical literature on the effect of globalization
on government programs. Subsequently, we will describe our data and method of estimation.
Section 4 contains the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature overview
The earlier literature on the globalization-welfare state nexus (for a survey, see Schulze
and Ursprung 1999) mainly dealt with three issues, the first one being the structural tax-
competition effect. Economic reasoning suggests that the tax burden is shifted away from
the increasingly mobile factors, i.e., in particular capital, when a country becomes increas-
ingly more integrated in the world economy. Notable contributions are Garrett (1995), Quinn
(1997), Rodrik (1997) and Swank (1997). The second issue directly addresses the question
whether globalization has a positive or negative effect on welfare state activities as measured
by the relative size of the government sector. The third avenue of investigation takes a more
differentiated approach to measuring welfare state activities by focusing not on the level of
government spending but on the structure thereof, i.e., on specific categories such as social
security and welfare expenditures. Notable contributions to these two lines of inquiry are
Hicks and Swank (1992), Huber et al. (1993), Garrett (1995), Cusack (1997), Garrett and
Mitchell (1997), Quinn (1997), Garrett (1998a, 1998b), Swank (1997), and Rodrik (1998).
After having surveyed the early literature, Schulze and Ursprung (1999, pp. 345–347)
arrive at the following conclusion:
1Interaction effects may, however, also emanate from policies that are not primarily fiscal in nature, such as
macroeconomic or environmental policies. For globalization induced effects on these policy fields, see, for
example, Tytell and Wei (2004) and Schulze and Ursprung (2001), respectively.
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“The general picture drawn by the few econometric studies available thus far does not
lend any support to any alarmist view. At an aggregate level, many of these studies find no
negative relationship between globalization and the nation states’ ability to conduct inde-
pendent fiscal policies. . . . Viewing the income and expenditure side of government budgets
separately, a cautious interpretation of the empirical evidence suggests that . . . it cannot be
rejected out of hand that the tax structure may have been influenced by the globalization
process—the observed decline in effective average CIT (corporate income tax) rates and
the convergence of CIT rates across countries is certainly compatible with such an interpre-
tation. . . . Given the small corporate income tax base and the fact that no shift of the tax
burden from capital to labour has taken place, it is not surprising that, on the expenditure
side, no strong evidence points to a significant globalization-induced change of the level of
public spending. But also accustomed expenditure patterns do not appear to have changed
in the course of globalization. This may be due, however, to a lack of studies using strongly
disaggregated public expenditure data.”
Many contributions to the more recent globalization literature have indeed taken up this
implicit challenge and have used disaggregated data in order to focus on specific welfare-
state programs; others have focused on specific groups of countries or have refined the em-
pirical methods. We briefly comment on some of these studies in turn.
In a reconsideration of their earlier unpublished study of 1997, Garrett and Mitchell
(2001) arrive at conclusions that contradict the received wisdom as summarized above: their
panel-data analysis appears to show that increases in trade are associated with less total
government spending, in particular lower security benefits as a share of GDP, which would
imply a preponderance of the disciplining effect over the compensation effect. Kittel and
Winner (2005) and Plümper et al. (2005) show, however, that the results obtained by Garrett
and Mitchell (2001) cannot be reproduced if the econometric model is properly specified.
Both follow-up studies rather come to the conclusion that government spending is primarily
driven by the state of the domestic economy and thus independent of international economic
openness, implying not only the absence of significant disciplining effects but also the ab-
sence of compensatory measures. This result is in line with the study by Iversen and Cusack
(2000) who do not find any relationship between globalization and the level of labour-market
risks (in terms of employment and wages), whereas uncertainty and dislocations caused by
deindustrialization appear to have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensa-
tion and risk sharing. The demand for welfare state activities thus appears to be homemade
and not to be induced by labour market risks related to international trade. Dreher and Gas-
ton (2007a) find that globalization gave rise to deunionization. However, in delving further
into the issue, they find that it is social integration, rather than economic integration, that
has been the main contributor to the decline in union membership. Bretschger and Hettich
(2002) use an ingenious novel measure of openness which corrects for country size and find
that globalization has a negative and significant impact on corporate income taxes and tends
to raise labour taxes. On the other hand, they also find that globalization increases social
expenditures. As a consequence, the disciplining effect impacts on the tax-mix, whereas
compensation is provided through increased social expenditures. Dreher (2006a), finally, in-
vestigates the impact of various dimensions of globalization on the tax mix and government
expenditures. None of the three dimensions of globalization have a significant influence on
either social spending or spending overall. The same is true for average effective tax rates on
consumption and labour. When it comes to tax rates on capital, however, the result depends
on how the tax burden is measured. While a globalization-induced increase in implicit tax
rates on capital is compatible with the data when the average effective tax rates constructed
by Carey and Rabesona (2002) are employed, the opposite conclusion can be drawn when
one uses the legislation-based data by Devereux and Griffith (2003).
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Studies focusing on specific groups of countries usually examine the impact of global
economic integration on developing countries. Rudra (2002), for example, observes that
defending welfare benefits under the pressures of globalization is much easier in OECD
countries that in LDCs. This result points to the crucial role of the political regime in ac-
commodating the demand side of the political market. Analyzing Latin American countries,
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) and Avelino et al. (2005) therefore control for the in-
fluence of the political regime. The empirical evidence uncovered by Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo favours the disciplining hypothesis. On the other hand, their results also suggest
that democracies may be more responsive to compensation demands than other regimes, at
least when it comes to social spending on health and education.2 Avelino, Brown and Hunter
confirm that education is positively associated with openness (as do Rudra 2004, and Ansell
2004, April), but obtain a more robust impact of democratic regimes and their estimates are
generally supportive of the compensation hypothesis; their overall results are quite in line
with those obtained by Adsera and Boix (2002) who used a more encompassing sample of
countries.
Apart from responding to globalization pressures in different ways, political regimes
may also be linked to globalization in a causal relationship. On the one hand, Richards et
al. (2001) discover systematic evidence that both foreign direct investment and portfolio in-
vestment are reliably associated with increased government respect for human rights. This
finding is corroborated by Rudra (2005) who finds that globalization in general strength-
ens democracy in the developing world if social safety nets are used to provide stability
and to build political support.3 On the other hand, quite a few studies show that civil and
political freedom in turn attract foreign direct investments (see, for example, Harms and Ur-
sprung 2002; Bengoa and Sanches-Robles 2003; Busse 2004), thus giving rise to a virtuous
globalization-democratization cycle.
This literature review indicates that there is no consensus on the impact of globalization
on government expenditures. The reason might be that the compensation, disciplining and
interaction effects as described in the introduction neutralize each other. It is likely, how-
ever, that the compensation and disciplining effects vary in size across the various types
of government expenditure. Therefore, the true test for any investigation of the impact of
globalization on government expenditures has to focus on shifts in the relevant expenditure
shares.4 It is this link between globalization and expenditure shares that the remainder of
our paper deals with.
3 Data and method
In order to test whether and to what extent globalization affects the composition of gov-
ernment expenditures, we estimate combined cross-section time-series (panel) regressions
with yearly data. To check for robustness over time, across countries and especially with
respect to the number of expenditure categories, we employ two datasets. The first dataset is
taken from the World Bank’s (2003) World Development Indicators. It contains data for up
2Globalization has also an effect on education via migration. This aspect has up to now mainly been analyzed
from a theoretical point of view; see, for example, Ansell (2003, August) and Gersbach and Schmutzler
(2005).
3The results obtained by Li and Reuveny (2003) are, however, much less supportive of this general hypothesis.
4See also the recent model in Exbrayat et al. (2006), who show how trade integration might affect the pattern
of public spending.
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Fig. 1 Development of average expenditure shares for a sample of 108 countries. Source: World Bank
(2003). Data ordered with respect to shares
to 108 countries covering the period 1970–2001. Data are classified according to four broad
expenditure categories: capital expenditures, expenditures for goods and services, interest
payments, and subsidies and other current transfers. This data is available as a share of total
expenditures. However, it covers central government expenditure only.
Figure 1 shows the development of the average expenditure shares over time for the
largest sample possible. The most prevalent feature of the graph is the increase in interest
payments over time (from 5 percent to 11.5 percent). The share of subsidies increased from
28.5 percent to 32.5 percent over the sample period, while the share of expenditures on
goods decreased from 46.1 percent to 40.3 percent, and the share of capital expenditures
from 20.4 to 15.7 percent. There is thus no obvious erosion in subsidies over time.5
The second dataset has been developed by the OECD and refers to general government
expenditures. The OECD Public Expenditure Database (2004) provides a much more de-
tailed classification of government expenditures. However, these data are available only
since 1990—and only for up to 15 OECD countries. For this smaller sample, the following
ten expenditure categories are available: expenditures on public services; defence; public
order and safety; economic affairs; protection of the environment; housing and community
amenities; health; recreation, culture and religion; education; and social expenditures. Fig-
ure 2 shows that the largest increases in shares have occurred for social expenditures (+4.2
percentage-points) and health expenditures (+3.2 percentage-points); for public services,
defence and economic affairs shares have decreased by 5.2, 3.0 and 2.1 percentage points,
respectively.
Our dependent variables are the respective expenditure categories as a (percentage) share
of total expenditures. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the
5This pattern also emerges for balanced samples, and for OECD countries only.
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Fig. 2 Development of average expenditure shares for a sample of 15 OECD countries. Source: OECD
Public Expenditure Database (2004). Data ordered with respect to changes over the sample; bottom series
have largest positive change, upper series have largest negative change
panel is unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory
variables. For ease of comparison, we keep the sample fixed (to those countries and years for
which all variables are available). Furthermore, we select our sample to only include those
observations for which these four or ten categories do indeed sum up to total government
expenditures (i.e., 100 percent). This results in a world sample of 624 observations contain-
ing 60 countries over the period 1971–2001. When we restrict this dataset to cover only
OECD countries, we have 255 observations for 18 countries over the years 1971–2001. In
both cases most observations stem from the 1980s and 1990s. Using the OECD dataset, i.e.,
focusing on ten expenditure categories, leaves us with 66 observations for only 10 countries
covering the years 1991–2001. We found significant fixed country effects in all specifica-
tions. However, the coefficients of the country dummies are not reported in the tables. All
variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in Appendix 1.
One potential problem with the World Bank data is that it excludes expenditures at lower
levels of government which might result in a blurring of our results. Even if central govern-
ment expenditure composition does not change, expenditure provided by lower tiers might
still do. However, Garrett and Rodden (2000) show that globalization increases centraliza-
tion. With increasing globalization, our data thus cover a larger share of overall expenditures.
If this increase is not evenly distributed across the spending categories, our analysis, which
uses central government data, is more likely to find an effect than an analysis based on total
government spending. Moreover, globalization is arguably more likely to affect the central
government than its lower-tiered jurisdictions. In many countries, horizontal competition be-
tween jurisdictions has always been strong. This competition is likely to dominate external
pressure, while central governments have to some extent been sheltered from competition
before the onset of globalization. Finally, our analysis includes fixed country effects and
thus controls for the federal structure of the countries in our sample. Overall, we therefore
conclude that data limitations when using the World Bank data do not pose a major prob-
lem. In any event, given the availability of general government expenditure data for OECD
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countries we can test for the consistency of our results to the inclusion of all government
sectors in the analysis.
To measure globalization, we employ various proxies that have been suggested in the
literature. The first is openness to trade as measured by the sum of imports and exports as
a share of GDP. The second indicator of globalization is the sum of the absolute values of
inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment (as a share of GDP)6 and the third refers
to restrictions on capital account transactions. The indicator of capital account restrictions
is constructed with binary data from the International Monetary Fund’s annual report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. We focus on four types of restrictions:
• restrictions on payments for capital account transactions,
• separate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions and/or some or all invisibles,
• surrender requirements for proceeds from exports and/or invisible transactions, and
• restrictions for payments on current transactions.
While the first three types of restrictions can broadly be interpreted as some kind of con-
trols on capital flows, the fourth restriction has been included because current transactions
can be used to circumvent restrictions on the capital account (Milesi-Ferretti 1998, 225).7
The respective data has been collected by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Dreher and
Siemers (2005).
Our index of capital account restrictions aggregates the four measures. The index takes
the value of 1 for fully restricted capital accounts, and 0 if no restrictions are in place.8
An obvious shortcoming of this approach is that it neither measures the intensity nor the
effectiveness of controls. One would also like to distinguish between controls on inflows and
outflows of capital. We do, however, neither have the data to adequately control for intensity
and effectiveness,9 nor the data that would allow an analysis of inflows and outflows.
Clearly, globalization is a broad concept that cannot be captured completely by the three
indicators discussed above. We therefore employ the globalization indicator as published
by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute. This KOF Index of Globalization has originally been
developed in Dreher (2006b), and is updated and calculated on a yearly basis over the period
1970–2003.10 The index captures the three main dimensions of globalization—economic
integration, political integration and social integration. It is based on a large number of
6Ideally, we would like to have the stocks of FDI instead of their flows as a measure of globalization. However,
FDI stocks are neither available over the entire period under study nor for all countries included.
7In 1997 the IMF changed the format of its survey. Following Glick and Hutchison (2000) and Dreher and
Siemers (2005) we coded “restrictions on payments for capital account restrictions” to be unity if controls
were in place in 5 or more of the sub-categories of capital account restrictions, and “financial credit” was one
of the categories restricted.
8A similar procedure has been employed, among others, by Gruben and McLeod (2001), Bai and Wei (2001)
and Dreher and Siemers (2005).
9To proxy the intensity or effectiveness of capital controls, black market premiums, onshore-offshore interest
differentials and deviations from covered interest parity have been employed (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano 1988;
Dooley and Isard 1980). However, those variables measure other aspects as well. We focus on the existence
rather than the degree of controls and do not use them.
10We use the 2006 version of the KOF index where the most recent data refers to the year 2003. The KOF
index has recently been used to analyze the impact of globalization on various economic, political and so-
cial outcomes. For example, Dreher (2006a) studies the impact on the size of government, Dreher (2006b)
focuses on economic growth, Tsai (2007) examines human well-being, Dreher and Gaston (2007a) examine
the impact on trade union membership, Bjørnskov (2006) studies the effects on institutional quality, Bergh
(2006) analyzes the impact of globalization on the welfare state, Lamla (2005) the impact of globalization on
pollution, and Dreher and Gaston (2007b) those on inequality. The data and detailed description is available at
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Fig. 3 Average development of the globalization indicators (1970 = 100). Source: World Bank (2003), Grilli
and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Dreher and Siemers (2005), Dreher (2006b): www.kof.ethz.ch/globalization
variables that relate to the three main dimensions of globalization. These variables have
been combined to form six groups: actual flows of trade and investment, restrictions of
international transactions, variables measuring the degree of political integration, variables
quantifying the extent of personal contacts with people living in foreign countries, variables
measuring trans-border flows of information, and a proxy for cultural integration. These six
groups are combined to form the three sub-indices and one overall index of globalization
with the help of an objective statistical method—the same method that has been applied by
Gwartney and Lawson (2001) in constructing their well-known economic freedom index.
We employ the overall index in addition to the more conventional proxies of globalization.
Figure 3 reports the world averages of the traditional measures of globalization and the
KOF Index of Globalization. As can be seen, globalization increased over the sample period
of about 30 years: The volume of trade and foreign direct investments markedly increased,
while capital account restrictions became less prevalent. Also, the KOF globalization index
increased substantially over this period.
Table 1 reports the correlations among our globalization measures. All correlation coef-
ficients have the expected sign. However, the absolute degree of correlation varies between
1 and 77 percent. This clearly indicates the difficulties associated with measuring a concept
like globalization.
Instead of (or in addition to) being affected by globalization, the expenditure composition
in a particular country might also depend directly on the composition in other countries.
Following Devereux et al. (2002), a country’s policy reaction function can be written as
yi,t = Ri(y−i,t−1,Xi,t ), (1)
with yi,t being the respective expenditure category, y−i,t−1being the vector of expenditure
shares in all other countries at time t − 1, and Xi,t being a vector of control variables.
www.kof.ethz.ch/globalization. A detailed description of the underlying methodology is provided in Dreher
et al. (2007).
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Table 1 Correlation matrices globalization indicators
Obs\Cor World-4 sample Country corrected
Trade FDI Cap. Acc. KOF Glob. Trade FDI Cap. Acc. KOF Glob.
Restr. index Restr. index
Trade 624 40% −10% 8% 20% −11% 29%
FBI 624 624 −35% 40% −22% 46%
Cap. Acc. Restr. 624 624 624 −70% −48%
KOF Glob. index 624 624 624 624
Obs\Cor OECD-4 sample Country corrected
Trade FDI Cap. Acc. KOF Glob. Trade FDI Cap. Acc. KOF Glob.
Restr. index Restr. index
Trade 255 24% −1% 19% 35% −10% 54%
FBI 255 255 −32% 40% −26% 52%
Cap. Acc. Restr. 255 255 255 −65% −57%
KOF Glob. index 255 255 255 255
Obs\Cor OECD-10 sample Country corrected
Trade FDI Cap. Acc. KOF Glob. Trade FDI Cap. Acc. KOF Glob.
Restr. index Restr. index
Trade 66 28% −14% −22% 34% −7% 77%
FBI 66 66 −22% 8% −7% 41%
Cap. Acc. Restr. 66 66 66 −52% −40%
KOF Glob. index 66 66 66 66
Note: In the last four columns, the data have been corrected for country-specific effects before correlation
coefficients are calculated
Clearly, this equation cannot be estimated given the available degrees of freedom. Fol-
lowing the earlier literature, Devereux et al. (2002) therefore suggest replacing the vector
y−i,t−1 by the weighted average Ai,t = ∑j =i ωij yjt . Since countries are more likely to re-
spond to countries in their immediate neighbourhood and less so to more distant ones, we
employ the inverse of the distance between the capital cities of the countries to arrive at the
weights ωij .11
The system of equations to be estimated is
ynit = αni + βni ynit−1 + γ ni Git + δni Anit−1 + ηn ′i Xit + εnit , (2)
11We also experimented with trade share as weights. As the qualitative results are not affected by this, we
refrain from reporting these results. They are available on request.
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where G represents our measure of globalization, αi is a country fixed effect, εit is an error
term, n either ranges from 1 to 4 (WB-dataset) or from 1 to 10 (OECD-dataset), i represents
the country and t the time period.12
The lagged dependent variable is included because the composition of government ex-
penditures changes only slowly over time and βni should be interpreted as a speed-of-
adjustment parameter. The reason for this inertia might be costs of adjustment on the part
of the private sector or constraints imposed by interest groups (Devereux et al. 2002: 4).
As a consequence, the estimated coefficients in front of the remaining explanatory variables
need to be interpreted as reflecting the initial impact on the respective expenditure share.
The long-run effect is given by the same coefficient divided by (1 − βni ).
We do not include fixed period effects, since they are already present in the weighted av-
erage and the lagged dependent variable (see Devereux et al. 2002 for details). Note that the
weighted average variable enters the regressions with a lag. From a theoretical perspective
this is preferable, since it takes time for a country to respond to changes in other coun-
tries’ policies. Econometrically, this allows estimation without instrumenting the potentially
endogenous contemporaneous average policy variables (Devereux et al. 2002).13
A general problem in empirical research when there is no accepted theoretical model
is the appropriate choice of covariates, i.e., variables entering our X-vector. We opt for a
list of seven variables to enter our model: real economic growth, the age dependency ratio,
government expenditures, government debt, the lending rate charged by banks on loans to
prime customers and the inflation rate.
The first variable—the growth rate of real GDP—accounts for the business cycle. Ar-
guably, one may expect subsidies to rise in recessions, while public investments are likely
to be reduced. According to Aubin et al. (1988), public capital spending is likely to de-
crease when inflation accelerates and to increase with increasing unemployment. As Dreher
(2006a) shows, social spending is significantly lower in periods of low growth.
The second variable which we include in our basic regressions is the share of under 15-
year and over 64-year old people relative to total population (“age dependency ratio”). The
dependency ratio controls for demographic factors. It is expected to vary positively with
subsidies and negatively with capital outlays.14
Our third variable is the total amount of public expenditures (in percent of GDP) since
there is good reason to believe that the composition of government expenditures also de-
pends on its level. In countries with smaller state sectors we expect social expenditures to be
relatively low, while government consumption is likely to be higher than in countries with
large state sectors.
Government debt and the lending rate are included since they directly affect the govern-
ments’ expenditure behavior. The rate of inflation, finally, has been shown to affect govern-
ment expenditure in previous work (e.g., Lin 1992).
Since the individual expenditure categories are not independent of each other—they sum
up to 100 percent of total expenditures—and the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables
implies that each equation has a different set of regressors, we estimate our equations using
12Note that our measures of globalization enter the regressions with their contemporaneous values. Lagging
these variables by one year does not qualitatively change the results.
13Dreher (2006a) and Dreher et al. (2007) apply the same methodology to test for the impact of globalization
on the size of public overall and social spending and effective tax rates on labour, consumption and capital.
14Overall, however, government total and social expenditure levels are not robustly related to the age depen-
dency ratio (Dreher 2006a).
274 Public Choice (2008) 134: 263–292
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The SUR model permits nonzero covariance be-
tween the error terms of the expenditure share equations, allowing for an improvement in
efficiency of SUR relative to the classical OLS estimator.
There are additional methodological problems. Given the inclusion of the lagged de-
pendent variable and fixed country effects, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent in
a short panel (Nickell 1981). Especially for the OECD data which are available for only
10 years we have to check whether the bias significantly affects our results. To deal with
this problem, we employ the system GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in addition to the SUR estimates. The dynamic panel
GMM estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment con-
ditions that remain informative even for persistent data and is considered most appropriate
in the presence of endogenous regressors. Results are based on the two-step estimator im-
plemented by Roodman (2005) in Stata, including Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample cor-
rection.
4 Results
We start by analyzing the four-category dataset. Table 2 shows the overall significance of the
independent variables in our four-equation system when using our balanced sample of 60
countries covering the 1971–2001 period. In each block one of our globalization variables is
included. The reported F -statistics test whether a particular variable can be excluded from
all four expenditure-share equations. Table 3 shows the results for the sample of OECD
countries only.
In both tables, the upper panel includes all control variables introduced above, while—in
order to increase efficiency (at the potential price of introducing an omitted variables bias)—
the lower panel includes only those covariates that are jointly significant at the five percent
level. As can be seen, the results are not affected by this. The results show that expendi-
ture shares are significantly affected by the level of government expenditures. The same is
true for the rate of inflation. In the world sample, the age dependency ratio also affects ex-
penditure shares, at the one percent level of significance. At the five percent level, central
government debt is significant in the OECD sample. Lending interest rate, GDP growth and
the average expenditure shares in neighbouring countries do not enter the systems of equa-
tions significantly. Most important for our analysis, none of the globalization variables turns
out to be significant in any of the specifications.
Turning now to the individual impact of the control and globalization variables, Table 4
reports the individual coefficients and significance levels underlying the results presented in
(the parsimonious specification of) Table 2. Table 5 shows the coefficients corresponding to
the OECD sample reported in Table 3. First, note that the estimated coefficients of the lagged
dependent variables are almost identical and mostly somewhat above 0.7. This implies that
there indeed is some inertia in expenditure shares and that a shock has a half-life of over
two years. Furthermore, for the interpretation of the remaining coefficients, this similarity
implies that the sum of the coefficients of a particular variable across the equations should
(and actually does) sum up to zero. Given the identical speed of adjustment across all four
categories, it must be the case that a positive impact on one expenditure share is neutralized
by a negative impact on some other expenditure shares.15
15Given the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, the estimated coefficients of the other variables need
to be interpreted as impact multipliers. To calculate the long-run effect of a particular variable, one has to
multiply it with 1/(1 − 0.72) ≈ 3.6.
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Table 2 Significance of variables in system regressions, 4 expenditure categories, SUR, 60 countries, 624
observations, 1971–2001
World - Trade World - FDI World - Cap. Rst. World - KOF
F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value
Exp. shares (−1) 2,039.17 0.00∗∗ 2,036.53 0.00∗∗ 2,027.52 0.00∗∗ 1,975.58 0.00∗∗
Weighted avg. shares 1.71 0.79 2.26 0.69 2.18 0.70 0.66 0.96
Central gov. exp. 37.00 0.00∗∗ 35.09 0.00∗∗ 36.55 0.00∗∗ 37.53 0.00∗∗
Inflation 15.32 0.00∗∗ 14.73 0.00∗∗ 12.23 0.00∗∗ 15.70 0.00∗∗
Interest rate 0.10 0.76 0.12 0.73 0.22 0.64 0.17 0.68
GDP growth 1.65 0.20 1.93 0.16 1.90 0.17 1.89 0.17
Age dependency 9.72 0.00∗∗ 10.41 0.00∗∗ 10.29 0.00∗∗ 7.77 0.01∗∗
Central gov. debt 0.10 0.75 0.10 0.75 0.07 0.80 0.02 0.89
Trade 0.33 0.57
FDI 0.64 0.42
Cap. Acc. Restr. 0.56 0.46
KOF Glob. index 0.01 0.94
World - Trade World - FDI World - Cap. Rst. World - KOF
F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value
Exp. share (−1) 2,614.56 0.00 2,604.80 0.00∗∗ 2,592.38 0.00∗∗ 2,591.02 0.00∗∗
Age dependency 9.48 0.00∗∗ 9.15 0.00∗∗ 8.78 0.00∗∗ 6.96 0.01∗∗
Central gov. exp. 41.22 0.00∗∗ 38.87 0.00∗∗ 40.82 0.00∗∗ 40.76 0.00∗∗
Inflation 41.48 0.00∗∗ 38.55 0.00∗∗ 32.47 0.00∗∗ 39.84 0.00∗∗
Trade 1.03 0.31
FDI 0.84 0.36
Cap. Acc. Restr. 0.46 0.50
KOF Glob. index 0.02 0.87
Notes: Each F -test reports whether the respective variable is jointly significant in the system of equations.
∗∗ or ∗ indicates significant at the 1 or 5 percent level, respectively. Fixed country effects are included
For the “world” sample shown in Table 4, the share of goods expenditures declines sig-
nificantly with inflation.16 Specifically, an increase in our measure of inflation by one point
decreases the share of goods expenditures by 0.13 percentage points. This is largely compen-
sated by an increase in interest payments, where a corresponding increase raises the share
by 0.09 percentage points.17 Goods and capital expenditures significantly increase with an
increasing age dependency ratio, while subsidies and interest payments represent the other
16To alleviate the interpretation of the regression coefficients, Appendix 2 contains an overview of the differ-
ent averages and standard errors across the different samples we use throughout this paper.
17Looking at standardized beta coefficients (not shown) reveals that a one standard deviation shock to infla-
tion ultimately results in roughly 2/3 of a standard deviation shock in both goods and interest expenditures.
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Table 3 Significance of variables in system regressions, 4 expenditure categories, SUR, 18 countries, 255
observations, 1971–2001
OECD - Trade OECD - FDI OECD - Cap. Rst. OECD - KOF
F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value
Exp. shares (−1) 1,056.71 0.00∗∗ 1,061.96 0.00∗∗ 1,074.83 0.00∗∗ 1,022.26 0.00∗∗
Weighted avg. shares 3.07 0.55 2.66 0.62 2.40 0.66 1.90 0.75
Central gov. exp. 18.98 0.00∗∗ 17.77 0.00∗∗ 18.90 0.00∗∗ 19.37 0.00∗∗
Inflation 27.05 0.00∗∗ 32.65 0.00∗∗ 30.09 0.00∗∗ 35.40 0.00∗∗
Interest rate 0.92 0.34 1.46 0.23 1.39 0.24 1.65 0.20
GDP growth 0.06 0.81 0.00 0.97 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.94
Age dependency 0.34 0.56 0.89 0.35 1.15 0.28 0.87 0.35
Central gov. debt 6.18 0.01∗ 9.55 0.00∗∗ 9.32 0.00∗∗ 10.14 0.00∗∗
Trade 0.51 0.47
FDI 0.68 0.41
Cap. Acc. Restr. 0.61 0.44
KOF Glob. index 0.65 0.42
OECD - Trade OECD - FDI OECD - Cap. Rst. OECD - KOF
F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value
Exp. share (−1) 1,219.94 0.00∗∗ 1,225.72 0.00∗∗ 1,219.27 0.00∗∗ 1,190.74 0.00∗∗
Central gov. exp. 20.01 0.00∗∗ 17.78 0.00∗∗ 19.95 0.00∗∗ 18.80 0.00∗∗
Inflation 66.56 0.00∗∗ 62.44 0.00∗∗ 43.30 0.00∗∗ 57.77 0.00∗∗
Central gov. debt 5.69 0.02∗ 9.18 0.00∗∗ 8.60 0.00∗∗ 9.92 0.00∗∗
Trade 0.58 0.45
FDI 0.66 0.42
Cap. Acc. Restr. 0.58 0.45
KOF globalization 0.47 0.49
Notes: Each F -test reports whether the respective variable is jointly significant in the system of equations.
∗∗ or ∗ indicates significant at the 1 or 5 percent level, respectively. Fixed country effects are included
side of the coin and significantly decrease. According to the coefficients, an increase in the
age dependency ratio by one increases the share of goods expenditures by 0.33 percentage
points and those of capital by 0.21 percentage points, while it reduces the share of subsidies
by 0.4 and those of interest by 0.14 percentage points. The result for the age dependency ra-
tio also holds for the OECD sample (as reported in Table 5), where—in addition—the share
of subsidies rises with inflation and the effect on interest expenditures is smaller in magni-
tude. Years in which total government expenditures as a share of GDP are above average,
are years in which goods expenditures are relatively low and especially interest expenditures
relatively high. In the world sample, the share of capital is also higher.18 In this sample, an
18Looking at standardized beta coefficients for the world sample (not shown) reveals that a one standard
deviation shock to total government expenditures ultimately results in roughly 2/3 of a standard deviation
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increase in total expenditure by one percentage point reduces the share of goods by 0.28 per-
centage point. The same increase raises the share of capital by 0.11 and those of interest by
0.09 percentage points. In the OECD sample, the corresponding decrease in the expenditure
share of goods is 0.16 percentage points, while the increase in the share of interest amounts
to 0.1 percentage points. More indebted OECD countries, finally, spend relatively less on
goods and capital, and (obviously) relatively more on interest. The quantitative impact of a
one percentage point increase in total expenditures is −0.16 percentage points for the share
of goods, and +0.1 percentage points regarding the share of expenditures on interest.
Turning to the globalization variables, our results reveal a rather clear picture. Trade, for-
eign direct investment and capital account restrictions never have a significant impact on any
of the expenditure shares. An increase in the KOF index of globalization gives, however, rise
to a significant decrease in the share of capital and interest expenditures in the OECD sam-
ple. Subsidies, in particular, appear to have profited from this regrouping of expenditures.
Taking this result at face value, there is some evidence in favour of the compensation hypoth-
esis. Note, however, that compared to the other explanatory variables the size of this effect
appears to be rather small. Using standardized coefficients (not shown), a one standard devi-
ation change in the KOF globalization index leads to only an 0.08 standard deviation impact
in the interest payment share. The effect of central government debt, for example, is roughly
three times larger. Furthermore, the index of globalization is not significant in the system of
regressions, casting some doubts about its actual relevance for expenditure composition.
As our next step, we repeat the above analysis using our OECD database which allows
us to distinguish between ten different expenditure classes.19
Table 6 shows the overall significance of the independent variables in our ten-equation
system when using the sample of 10 countries covering the 1991–2000 period. As be-
fore, the reported F -statistics test whether a particular variable can be excluded from all
ten expenditure-share equations. The upper panel includes all control variables, while the
lower panel includes only those that are jointly significant at the five percent level. Again,
the results are not affected by this. For this more detailed system of expenditure shares, the
distance weighted averages, total general government expenditure share in GDP, the interest
rate as well as the age dependency ratio appear to have a highly significant influence. The
inflation rate and economic growth do, however, not enter the systems of equations in a sig-
nificant way. In line with the two four-equation samples, none of the globalization variables
is significant.
The upper half of Table 7 reports individual coefficient estimates of the system in which
no globalization variables are included. The bottom half summarizes the results of four
systems of equations, each adding one of our globalization variables at a time while the
covariates listed in the upper half remain included in each regression.20 As compared to the
previous models, this time the speed of adjustment coefficients differ substantially across
the expenditure categories. Also the degree to which our model can explain the variation in
these expenditure categories varies much more. Whereas we explain no more than 8 percent
shock in goods expenditures. For the largest part this is compensated by reductions in capital and interest
expenditure shares.
19Note that for matters of consistency the world sample includes central government expenditures, while the
10 category OECD sample uses general government expenditure.
20Due to space restraints and because the coefficient estimates of the baseline variables are hardly affected,
only the coefficients of the globalization variables are reported in the bottom half.
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Table 6 Significance of variables in system regressions, 10 expenditure categories, SUR, 10 OECD coun-
tries, 66 observations, 1991–2000
OECD - Trade OECD - FDI OECD - Cap. Rst. OECD - KOF
F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value
Exp. shares (−1) 579.79 0.00∗∗ 601.19 0.00∗∗ 592.77 0.00∗∗ 525.60 0.00∗∗
Weighted avg. shares 28.92 0.00∗∗ 41.99 0.00∗∗ 42.24 0.00∗∗ 34.23 0.00∗∗
General gov. exp. 9.93 0.00∗∗ 9.29 0.00∗∗ 10.12 0.00∗∗ 8.83 0.00∗∗
Inflation 0.33 0.57 0.13 0.71 0.48 0.49 0.09 0.77
Interest rate 10.39 0.00∗∗ 7.76 0.01∗∗ 9.71 0.00∗∗ 8.79 0.00∗∗
GDP growth 0.09 0.77 0.42 0.51 1.09 0.30 0.66 0.42
Age dependency 20.84 0.00∗∗ 20.04 0.00∗∗ 22.01 0.00∗∗ 19.47 0.00∗∗
Trade 1.26 0.26
FDI 0.14 0.70
Cap. Acc. Restr. 1.14 0.29
KOF Glob. index 0.18 0.67
OECD - Trade OECD - FDI OECD - Cap. Rst. OECD - KOF
F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value F -test p-value
Exp. share (−1) 557.71 0.00∗∗ 580.92 0.00∗∗ 570.17 0.00∗∗ 561.02 0.00∗∗
Weighted avg. shares 28.30 0.00∗∗ 42.00 0.00∗∗ 42.85 0.00∗∗ 32.49 0.00∗∗
General gov. exp. 11.50 0.00∗∗ 11.41 0.00∗∗ 11.49 0.00∗∗ 11.49 0.00∗∗
Interest rate 11.74 0.00∗∗ 7.25 0.01∗∗ 9.44 0.00∗∗ 7.61 0.01∗∗
Age dependency 20.52 0.00∗∗ 20.38 0.00∗∗ 21.11 0.00∗∗ 20.67 0.00∗∗
Trade 1.47 0.22
FDI 0.16 0.69
Cap. Acc. Restr. 0.29 0.59
KOF Glob. index 0.02 0.88
Notes: Each F -test reports whether the respective variable is jointly significant in the system of equations. **
or * means significant at the 1 or 5 percent level, respectively. Fixed country effects are included
of the variation in housing expenditures, for the public services categories this rises to 78
percent.21
As can be seen from Table 7, occasionally one of the globalization variables appears to
have a significant influence in individual equations. Spending on recreation, for example,
becomes more important when capital account restrictions are more severe, and spending
on economic affairs becomes less important with deepening globalization as measured by
the KOF index, while the shares of health and education increase. Nevertheless, the four
globalization variables are all jointly insignificant in the system of equations. We therefore
conclude that globalization did not affect the composition of government expenditures.
21Note that the R2-values are adjusted for country-specific effects.
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In order to check for the robustness of our results, we experimented with using log trans-
formations of those series which might be expected to be skewed. Taking the logarithms of
the individual expenditure shares and the logarithm of total expenditures as a share of GDP
does, however, not affect our results.22
Next, we replicate the entire analysis employing the consistent system GMM estimator.
Again, the covariates introduced above are included in all regressions, but are not shown. We
employed a Hansen test to check whether the instruments are not correlated with the error
term, and the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in the first difference
residuals. With very few exceptions, both tests clearly do not reject the specifications. The
results are summarized in Table 8.
The upper-left part of Table 8 reports results for the world sample, while the upper-right
part contains those for the restricted sample of OECD countries. As can be seen, the GMM
estimates generally confirm the previous results. In most regressions, our measures of glob-
alization are completely insignificant. In the world sample, not one coefficient is significant
at the five percent level, strongly indicating that globalization did not affect expenditure
composition across the world. Turning to the OECD, the results are less obvious. In four out
of 16 regressions, globalization does significantly affect specific expenditure shares, with-
out, however, showing a consistent picture. We take this result as further evidence against
the existence of a robust impact of globalization.
The bottom half of Table 8, finally, reports the coefficients and t -values for the detailed
expenditure categories. The results confirm those reported previously. While some of the
globalization measures appear to influence specific expenditure shares, the results are far
from showing a clear picture. Overall, we believe it is safe to say that globalization does not
robustly affect the composition of government expenditures.
5 Summary
In this paper, we examined the composition of public expenditures rather than the overall
level. Economic theory suggests that different kinds of government expenditures are likely
to react differently to globalization. According to the disciplining hypothesis, globalization
restrains governments by inducing increased budgetary pressure. As a consequence, gov-
ernments shift their expenditures away from transfers and subsidies towards, e.g., capital
expenditures.
The compensation effect, on the other hand, is expected to give rise to a higher share of
social expenditures. The expenditure shift induced by the disciplining effect might therefore
be diminished, neutralized, or even reversed by citizens’ preferences to be compensated for
the risks of globalization.
We employed two different datasets and various measures of globalization to analyze
whether globalization has influenced the composition of government expenditures. For a
sample of 108 countries, we examined the development of four broad expenditure cate-
gories for the period 1970–2001: capital expenditures; expenditures for goods and services;
interest payments; and subsidies and other current transfers. For the OECD countries in
the post-1990 period, we examined a dataset providing a much more detailed classification:
expenditures on public services; defence; public order and safety; economic affairs; protec-
tion of the environment; housing and community amenities; health; recreation, culture and
religion; education; and social expenditures.
22Note that this reduces the number of observations somewhat as reported expenditure shares sporadically
equal zero.
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Our econometric analyzes did not reveal any robust globalization-induced effects. We
therefore conclude that globalization has not affected the composition of government expen-
ditures. There are three potential explanations for this result. First, taking a Public Choice
perspective, the efficiency and compensation effects might neutralize each other, implying
that the marginal increase in political support deriving from extending the size and scope
of compensation programs is offset by the marginal loss in political support associated with
raising the requisite additional funds. Second, the effects of globalization might be blurred
by potential indirect effects between different expenditure categories. And third, the effects
of globalization might be exaggerated in the popular discussion and might simply not exist.
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Appendix 1: Data description and sources
Variable Description Source
Capital expenditure Capital expenditure is spending to acquire World Bank (2003)
fixed capital assets, land, intangible assets,
government stocks, and nonmilitary,
nonfinancial assets. Also included are capital
grants. Data are shown for central
government only and are shown in percent
of total expenditure.
Goods and services Goods and services include all government World Bank (2003)
expenditure payments in exchange for goods and
services, whether in the form of wages and
salaries to employees or other purchases of
goods and services. Data are shown for
central government only and are shown in
percent of total expenditure.
Interest payments Interest payments are payments made to World Bank (2003)
domestic sectors and to nonresidents for the
use of borrowed money. (Repayment of
principal is shown as a financing item, and
commission charges are shown as purchases
of services.) Interest payments do not
include payments by government as
guarantor or surety of interest on the
defaulted debts of others, which are
classified as government lending. Data are
shown for central government only and are
shown in percent of total expenditure.
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(Continued)
Variable Description Source
Subsidies and other Subsidies and other current transfers include World Bank (2003)
current transfers all unrequited, nonrepayable transfers on
current account to private and public
enterprises, and the cost of covering the cash
operating deficits of departmental enterprise
sales to the public by departmental
enterprises. Data are shown for central
government only and in percent of total
expenditure.
Public services Expenditures on general public services. OECD (2004)
Data are shown for general government and
are in percent of total expenditure.
Defence Expenditures on defence. Data are shown for OECD (2004)
general government and are in percent of
total expenditure.
Public order and Expenditures on public order and safety. OECD (2004)
safety Data are shown for general government and
are in percent of total expenditure.
Economic affairs Expenditures on economic affairs. Data are OECD (2004)
shown for general government and are in
percent of total expenditure.
Environment Expenditures on environment protection. OECD (2004)
Data are shown for general government and
are in percent of total expenditure.
Housing and commu- Expenditures on housing and community OECD (2004)
nity amenities amenities. Data are shown for general
government and are in percent of total
expenditure.
Health Expenditures on health. Data are shown for OECD (2004)
general government and are in percent of
total expenditure.
Recreation, culture Expenditures on recreation, culture and OECD (2004)
and religion religion. Data are shown for general
government and are in percent of total
expenditure.
Education Expenditures on education. Data are shown OECD (2004)
for general government and are in percent of
total expenditure.
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(Continued)
Variable Description Source
Social Social expenditures. Data are shown for OECD (2004)
general government and are in percent of
total expenditure.
FDI Gross foreign direct investment is the sum of World Bank (2003)
the absolute values of inflows and outflows
of foreign direct investment recorded in the
balance of payments financial account. It
includes equity capital, reinvestment of
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-
term capital. This indicator differs from the
standard measure of foreign direct
investment, which captures only inward
investment. Data are in percent of GDP.
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of World Bank (2003)
goods and services measured as a share of
gross domestic product, (x)/(1 + x).
Capital Account See text. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995),
Restrictions Dreher and Siemers (2005)
Globalization, index Index constructed with Principal Dreher (2006b)
Components Analysis comprising 23
variables measuring globalization.
Age Dependency Age dependency ratio is the ratio of World Bank (2003)
Ratio dependents—people younger than 15 and
older than 64—to the working-age population
—those ages 15–64. For example, 0.7 means
there are 7 dependents for every 10 working-
age people.
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at World Bank (2003)
market prices based on constant local
currency. Aggregates are based on constant
1995 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross
value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus
any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. It is calculated without making
deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources.
Public Choice (2008) 134: 263–292 287
(Continued)
Variable Description Source
Central Government Total expenditure includes both current and World Bank (2003)
Expenditure capital expenditures. It does not include
government lending or repayments to the
government or government acquisition of
equity for public purposes. Data are shown
for central government only and are in
percent of GDP.
General Government Total expenditure defined as the sum of the OECD (2004),
Expenditure above-list 10 categories. Data are shown for World Bank (2003)
the general government and are in percent of
nominal GDP, where GDP is taken from the
World Bank (2003).
Government Debt Total debt is the entire stock of direct, World Bank (2003)
government, fixed term contractual
obligations to others outstanding at a
particular date. It includes domestic debt
(such as debt held by monetary authorities,
deposit money banks, nonfinancial public
enterprises, and households) and foreign
debt (such as debt to international
development institutions and foreign
governments). It is the gross amount of
government liabilities not reduced by the
amount of government claims against others.
Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it
is measured as of a given date, usually the
last day of the fiscal year. Data are shown
for central government only and are in
percent of GDP.
Lending Rate Lending interest rate is the rate charged by World Bank (2003)
banks on loans to prime customers,
(x)/(1 + x).
Inflation Inflation, growth in GDP deflator, (x)/(1 + x). World Bank (2003)
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